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Abstract
Modern societies feature an increasing contact between cultures, yet we have a
poor understanding of what the outcomes might be. Here we consider a mathematical
model of contact between social groups, grounded in social psychology and analyzed
using tools from statistical physics. We use the model to study how a culture might
be affected by immigration. We find that in some cases residents’ culture is relatively
unchanged, but in other cases residents may adopt the opinions and beliefs of immi-
grants. The decisive factors are each group’s cultural legacy and its attitudes towards
in- and out-groups. The model can also predict how social policies may influence the
outcome of culture contact.
1 Introduction
Contact between cultures is a prominent feature of modern society, driven by large-scale
migration, global media, communication networks, and other socio-economical forces (1).
Understanding how human cultures interact is crucial to such issues as immigration man-
agement and the survival of national and minority cultures (2, 3), yet the dynamics of cul-
ture contact are poorly known. Here we explore the problem considering a single cultural
trait that can take two forms, such as being in favor or against the death penalty, or whether
to wear or not a particular piece of clothing. We are interested in: 1) how the two trait forms
are distributed among subgroups in a population, e.g., residents and immigrants, males and
females, social classes, etc.; and 2) how different subgroups influence each other’s traits.
We start with assumptions about how individuals may change their opinions and behaviors
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as a consequence of social interactions, and then derive the population-level consequences
of such assumptions using tools from statistical physics. We study the case of immigration
in detail, and conclude that culture contact may sometime result in residents taking on the
opinions and beliefs of immigrants, depending on each group’s cultural legacy, its attitudes
toward in- and out-groups, and social policies.
Our main assumption about how individuals may change their traits is the so-called
“similarity-attraction” hypothesis of social psychology: an individual tends to agree with
those who are perceived as similar to oneself, and to disagree with those who are perceived
as different (4, 5, 6, 7). Additionally, individuals can be influenced by other forces favoring
one form of a trait over the other. For instance, a media campaign may advertise in favor
or against a given idea or behavior. To determine the distribution of opinions among sub-
groups of a population (after they have been in contact for some time) we apply statistical
mechanics, a branch of theoretical physics that studies the collective properties of systems
composed of many parts that interact according to given rules. These techniques were orig-
inally developed to derive the laws of thermodynamics from molecular dynamics (8), but
have been applied also to biological (9, 14) and social systems, including models of social
choice (10, 11, 12, 13, 15). The latter consider how collective opinions or choices emerge
within a homogeneous social group. The model we discuss here is, to our knowledge, the
first one to consider populations consisting of different social groups in interaction.
3
2 General framework
We now outline a general framework for modelling group-level consequences of inter-
actions among individuals (16). Individual i is described by a binary variable si = ±1,
representing the two possible forms of the considered trait (i = 1, . . . ,N). A group is char-
acterized by the mean value m = 1N ∑i si, which can be measured by, say, a referendum vote
or a survey. To apply statistical mechanics we formalize as follows the interaction between
individuals. Let Lik be the similarity that individual i perceives with k and assume that
L0 is the level of similarity above which individuals tend to agree, and below which they
tend to disagree. We can then recast the similarity-attraction hypothesis in the form of a
minimization rule, assuming that i, when interacting with k, tends to assume the trait value
that minimizes the quantity
Hik(si,sk) =−(Lik−L0)sisk (1)
This assumption agrees with the similarity-attraction hypothesis because, when Lik > L0
the expression is minimized by agreement (sisk = 1), and when Lik < L0 by disagreement
(sisk = −1). For simplicity we let Lik − L0 = Jik in the following. Then Jik > 0 favors
agreement and Jik < 0 favors disagreement. We say “favor” because we do not assume
strict minimization. Rather, we assume that a trait value yielding a lower value of (1)
occurs with a higher probability, but not with certainty (see appendix). The rationale for
this assumption is that similarity to others is not the sole determinant of an individual’s trait
(6, 7).
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When an individual interacts with many others, we assume that she tends to minimize
the sum, Hi, of all functions (1) relative to each interaction:
Hi(si) = ∑
k
Hik(si,sk) =−∑
k
Jiksisk (2)
where the sum extends over all individuals with whom i interacts. In summary, the effect of
changing one’s trait is gauged according to whether it makes an individual agree or disagree
with others,
The effect of factors such as the media or social norms is, for each individual, to favor
a particular trait value. This can be included in our minimization scheme by adding a term
to (2):
Hi(si) =−∑
k
Jiksisk −hisi (3)
The added term means that si = 1 is favored if hi > 0, while hi < 0 favors si =−1. We now
define a group-level function H as the sum of individual functions:
H(s) = ∑
i
Hi(si) =−∑
i,k
Jiksisk−∑
i
hisi (4)
where s = {s1, . . . ,sN} is the set of all individual traits. The function H is referred to as
the system Hamiltonian in statistical mechanics, where it usually arises from consideration
of a system’s physical properties. Here, on the other hand, we have designed the function
H so that lower values of H correspond to group states that, given our assumptions about
individual psychology, are more likely to occur. It is this property that allows us to use
statistical mechanics (8). Note that we do not assume that individuals explicitly carry out,
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or are aware of, the computations in equation (4).
3 Culture contact in immigration
We consider a large and a small group, referred to, respectively, as residents (R) and im-
migrants (I). We are interested in the effect of one group upon the other, i.e., how culture
contact changes the mean trait values in the two groups. If residents and immigrants have
markedly different culture, the similarity-attraction hypothesis implies that Jik should be
positive for interactions within a group and negative for interactions between groups. A
simple assumption (called mean field in statistical mechanics) is that Jik depends only on
group membership. This corresponds to the ingroup and outgroup concepts of social psy-
chology (17) and can be formalized as follows:
Jik =


Jres
2N
> 0 i,k ∈ R
Jint
2N
< 0 i ∈ R,k ∈ I, or i ∈ I,k ∈ R
Jimm
2N
> 0 i,k ∈ I
(5)
where the factor 1/2N guarantees that the group function, equation (4), grows proportion-
ally to the number of individuals. Before the two groups interact, residents and immigrants
are each characterized by a cultural legacy that includes given mean values of the consid-
ered trait, say m∗res and m∗imm. Our goal is to predict the values mres and mimm after the
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interaction has taken place. To describe the effect of cultural legacies we reason as follows.
Within a group, a mean trait m∗ 6= 0 means that the two forms of the trait are not equally
common. Thus preexisting culture can be seen as a force that favors one trait value over
the other, and can be modeled by a force term as in (3). In other words, a model in which
individuals are biased so that the mean trait is m∗ is equivalent to a model with unbiased
individuals subject to a force h∗ of appropriate intensity. The latter can be calculated by
standard methods of statistical mechanics as
h∗ = atanh(m∗)− Jm∗ (6)
where atanh(·) is the inverse hyperbolic tangent and J is the ingroup attitude (8, 16). Sta-
tistical mechanics also allows to calculate the values of mres and mimm after culture contact
as the solution of a system of equations (see appendix):


mres = tanh
(
(1−α)Jresmres +αJintmimm +h∗res
)
mimm = tanh
(
(1−α)Jintmres +αJimmmimm +h∗imm
)
(7)
where tanh(·) is the hyperbolic tangent, α is the fraction of immigrants in the compound
group, and h∗res and h∗imm are calculated for each group according to (6). Numerical analysis
of these equations reveals two main patterns of behavior depending on the sign of the
product m∗resm∗immJint (figure 1). When m∗resm∗immJint > 0 a small fraction of immigrants
causes only small changes in residents’ trait, as intuition would suggest. This includes two
distinct cases: either the two groups agreed before the interaction (m∗resm∗imm > 0) and have
7
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Figure 1: Influence of immigration on resident culture. Each panel portraits the mean resident trait
after culture contact, mres, as a function of the fraction of immigrants, α , and the strength and sign
of outgroup attitude, Jint. Dramatic shifts in resident trait occur only when Jintm∗resm∗imm < 0 (b, d)
but not when Jintm∗resm∗imm (a, c), where m∗res and m∗imm are, respectively, residents’ and immigrants’
mean traits before cultural interaction. Parameter values: Jres = 1, Jimm = 0.7, m∗res = 0.7, m∗imm =
−0.5 (a, c) or m∗imm = 0.5 (b, d).
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Figure 2: Ingroup attitudes and shifts in cultural traits. Each line shows the critical fraction of
immigrants, αc, above which a sudden shift in residents’ trait is observed, as a function of the
strength of residents’ ingroup attitude, Jres. The curves are identical for the cases in figure 1b and
c, i.e., for positive or negative Jint. For each value of m∗res (different lines), lowering Jres sharply
increases the fraction of immigrants that can be sustained before residents significantly change trait.
similar culture (Jint > 0, figure 1a) or they disagree and have dissimilar culture (m∗resm∗imm <
0 and Jint < 0, figure 1d). The second pattern of results occurs when m∗resm∗immJint < 0, in
which case there exists a critical fraction of immigrants, αc, above which residents suddenly
change to a nearly opposite mean trait value. This can happen either when the two groups
agree and have dissimilar culture (m∗resm∗imm > 0 and Jint < 0, figure 1b) or when the groups
disagree and have similar culture (m∗resm∗imm < 0 and Jint > 0, figure 1c). This dramatic
phenomenon only exists when attitudes toward the outgroup (either positive, figure 1b, or
negative, figure 1c) are strong enough. The shift can thus be inhibited by decreasing the
magnitude of Jint. According to our assumptions, this amounts to making the groups less
similar when they are similar and less different when they are different.
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Figure 3: Social incentives and shifts in cultural traits. Both panels plot the critical fraction of
immigrants, αc, above which a sudden shift in residents’ trait is observed, as a function of the
strength of a social incentive capable of affecting individual traits, modeled as an external force, h
(equation 3). a: a social incentive is added to the situation in figure 1b (h = 0, red dot in this figure).
If h favors (opposes) the residents’ original trait value, the critical fraction of immigrants is raised
(lowered). b: a social incentive is added to the situation in figure 1d, in which no dramatic change is
predicted. When h is decreased from 0 toward negative values, residents’ trait changes very slightly
(not shown), until a critical value hc is reached when a sudden shift in residents’ trait is predicted
with a very small fraction of immigrants. Parameter values as in figure 1.
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There are other ways in which dramatic shifts in residents’ trait may be prevented.
It is possible, for instance, to reduce the strength of residents’ ingroup attitude, Jres (fig-
ure 2). According to the similarity-attraction hypothesis, a higher value of Jres corresponds
to higher ingroup similarity. Hence our model suggests that a more culturally homoge-
neous groups has a greater risk of undergoing a dramatic transition when confronted with
an immigrant culture. That is, encouraging cultural diversity among residents may make
their culture more robust. One may also try to influence individuals directly, introducing,
e.g., social incentives that encourage a given trait (modeled by h terms as in equation 3).
Consider a situation in which residents are predicted to change trait when the fraction of
immigrants passes a critical value, αc (figure 1b). In such a case αc can be increased sub-
jecting individuals to an incentive h that favors the residents’ original trait (figure 3a). An
incentive in the opposite direction, on the other hand, decreases αc, suggesting that the
impact of social policies can be dramatic. Indeed, we show in figure 3 that an incentive h
can trigger dramatic changes even when these are impossible with h = 0, as for instance in
figure 1d.
4 Discussion
Clearly, our model is only an approximation to the complexities of culture contact. Yet it
exhibits a rich set of behaviors that, we hope, may help to understand this complex phe-
nomenon and promote the development of more refined models. Our approach can be de-
veloped by considering more individual traits (so that changes in culture as a whole can be
assessed), more realistic patterns of interactions among individuals (social networks), indi-
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vidual variability in ingroup and outgroup attitudes, and more complex rules of individual
interaction. Our basic hypothesis (similar individuals imitate each other more strongly than
dissimilar ones), however, is well rooted in social psychology (4, 6), including studies of
intergroup behavior (5, 7), and we expect it to remain an important feature of future models.
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Appendix
Statistical mechanics assigns to each system configuration s a probability that is inversely
related to the value of H(s) through an exponential function (8)
Pr(s) =
e−H(s)
∑s e−H(s)
(8)
where the denominator is a normalization factor ensuring ∑s Pr(s) = 1. Equation (8) can
be proved in a number of important cases (8), but is also used heuristically in more general
settings (18). In particular, the exponential is the only function compatible with basic
assumptions relevant for social as well as physical systems, such that the probability of
events relative to two independent subsystems must multiply while other quantities (e.g.,
entropy, see below) must add (19).
The probability distribution (8) is used to calculate the so-called free energy, from
which one can derive system-level quantities such as the mean trait values mres and mimm.
The free energy is defined as the difference between internal energy U , i.e. the average of
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H with respect to (8), and entropy S =−∑s Pr s lnPr s:
F =U −S (9)
For the model in the main text one may show that (20)
U = − 12
(
Jres(1−α)2m2res + Jimmα2m2imm +2Jintα(1−α)mimmmres
)
+
− (1−α)h∗resmres−αh∗immmimm.
(10)
and
S = (1−α)
(
−
1+mres
2
ln
(
1+mres
2
)
−
1−mres
2
ln
(
1−mres
2
))
+
α
(
−
1+mimm
2
ln
(
1+mimm
2
)
−
1−mimm
2
ln
(
1−mimm
2
))
. (11)
The values of mres and mimm are obtained from these expressions by minimizing (9), which
yields equation (7).
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